CONTROLLING "PIRATE" BROADCASTING
This Comment discusses the problem of "pirate"broadcasting and what measures have been taken to suppress this form
of unauthorizedbroadcasting.Firstconsidered is the concept
of extraterritorialjurisdictionand how it relates to "pirate"
broadcasting. The Comment then examines specific occurrences of "pirate"broadcasting,including legislative action
taken and theories of control used to justify the actions.
Finally, the author analyzes recent United Nations action
embodied in the Informal CompositeNegotiating Text, possible factors behind its enactment, and its legal ramifications.
He concludes that the action taken by the United Nations is
valuable, although it may be somewhat outdated.
INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial jurisdiction or the right of control over persons or
things located outside territorial boundaries is a growing problem of
international law. As nations become more interdependent and less
isolated, the problem takes on new aspects. One relatively new aspect
of this problem is radio and television broadcasting from ships or
fixed structures located on the high seas,' usually just outside territorial waters. These transmissions are directed toward audiences in
nearby coastal States. The so-called "pirate" broadcasting stations
are moored or installed outside territorial waters to escape regulation by coastal States.2
Although unauthorized broadcasting does not technically constitute piracy,3 governments have been anxious to suppress the stations
for a number of reasons. First, the stations operate on frequencies
which have been allocated to other stations or are so close to assigned
frequencies that electrical interference is likely.4 Thus, "pirate" stations may acquire listeners by using frequencies assigned to other
1. "The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." Convention on the High Seas,
done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
2. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, Legal Aspects of PirateBroadcasting,
60 AM. J. INT'L L. 303 (1966). See also D. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL 87 (1969).

3. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 15.

4. Hunnings, Pirate Broadcastingin European Waters, 14 INT'L & CoMP.
L.Q. 418 (1965). See also B. PAULU, RADIo AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING ON THE
EUROPEAN CONTINENT 22 (1967).

stations, thereby diminishing the other stations' listening audience.
Second, by causing interference the transmissions may adversely
affect sea and air communications.' Third, unregulated broadcasting
poses a threat to national monopolies and public control over this
type of communication.6 For example, most European countries prohibit commerical exploitation of broadcasting, and some prohibit
advertising. However, "pirate" stations are not bound by these prohibitions. Fourth, the broadcasts may contravene national law, such
as obscenity laws and laws prohibiting certain types of political
broadcasts. Thus, the broadcasts' contents might endanger national
security and the public good. Finally, the stations may broadcast
material without making royalty payments to copyright and performing rights
holders and without paying the proper revenue and
7
other taxes.

"Pirate" broadcasting has been a serious problem in the past and
may be one of even greater proportion in the future. Because of
advanced technology and the recent emergence of airborne transmissions, the possibility of extensive "pirate" broadcasting poses a serious economic and political threat to many nations. Several countries
have already enacted legislation prohibiting unauthorized broadcasts. In July, 1977, the United Nations also took action by adopting
a resolution providing sanctions against "pirate" broadcasting.
PROBLEMS CONCERNING EXTRATERRITOBIAL JURISDICTION

"Pirate" broadcasting has caused problems concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction because "pirate" stations do not broadcast under
the authority of or in accordance with the legislation of the coastal
States. Instead, the stations broadcast on frequencies not assigned to
them and operate in international waters either without a flag8 or
merely with a flag of convenience. 9 With an increased number of
transmitting stations on the high seas, the question of State control
over these stations becomes extremely important. The notion that the
waters of the sea are free to all has received general acceptance by
the international community. Therefore, attempts to extend national
5. B. PAULU, supra note 4, at 22; van Panhuys and van Emde Boas, supra
note 2, at 311.
6. B. PAULU, supra note 4, at 22; M. SIBTHORP, THE NORTH SEA: CHALLENGE
AND OPPORTUNrrY 154 (1975).
7. B. PAULU, supra note 4, at 22; Hunnings, supra note 4, at 413.
8. This activity, of course, does not apply to stations operating on artificial
islands. Ships on the high seas must fly the flag of a State, thereby displaying
their nationality.
9. A flag of convenience is one which a ship uses generally in order to avoid
strict controls. A ship using a flag as a matter of convenience, changing flags as
it chooses, may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.
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sovereignty to regulate unauthorized broadcasting are quite
complicated and the jurisdictional difficulties are formidable.
Throughout the history of "pirate" broadcasting, States have tried
to justify their action-or inaction-against the stations by relying
on Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas.' 0 The controversy
over the correct interpretation of this article has led to a number of
different views. One extreme view suggests that the term "inter
alia," accompanied by words allowing other freedoms "recognized
by general principles of international law," means that all peaceful
uses of the seas are permissible." Accordingly, the four listed freedoms are not exclusive; however, States may not engage in acts
which adversely affect the use of the high seas by other States. 1 2 A
narrower view would restrict uses of the high seas to those expressly
recognized. 3 A more moderate view applies a test of "reasonable4
ness" to additional uses of the high seas.'
The general rules of international law concerning extraterritorial
jurisdiction are briefly stated 15 as follows: (1) a State has jurisdiction
to make laws governing the acts of its nationals wherever they may
be; (2) a State has some jurisdiction to apply its laws to acts committed by foreigners on the high seas;' 6 (3) a State does not always have a
10. The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas
is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, interalia,both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 2.
11. D. Srmrh, supra note 2, at 41; van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note
2, at 338.
12. D. SmTH, supra note 2, at 41.
13. Id., at 43; van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 338.
14. D. SmTH, supra note 2, at 42.
15. See D. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 665-910; Hunnings, supra note 4,

at 430-31.

16. "On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any

State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy
and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property
on board." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 19.

right to enforce its laws extraterritorially, but may exercise its juris-

diction once a person enters its territory; and (4) a State with
national, flag, or territorial jurisdiction over a person, ship, or installation can transfer its rights in favor of another State, thus extending
the latter's customary rights under (2) and (3) above. 17 For example,
if a ship of United States registration within French territory violated French law, France would have jurisdiction. However, France
may transfer its rights to the United States.
Questions arise as to whether any. State may exercise domestic
jurisdiction in the international area and the extent of a State's
jurisdiction over aliens or citizens for acts committed outside that
State's territory. A coastal State's jurisdiction over the contiguous
zone 8 and continental shelf'" does not govern broadcasts from "pirate" stations. Finally, ships on the high seas historically have been
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State. If the flag State
was unwilling or unable to exercise control over the ship, the coastal
State was without a remedy. Today, however, international agreements20 and some case law2 ' allow remedies in certain situations. The
following discussion of the history of "pirate" broadcasting illustrates the problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

"Pirate"Broadcasting'sInitialAppearance
Throughout the history of "pirate" broadcasting, much legislation
has been enacted.2 2 However, a general consensus within the international community regulating the broadcasters or imposing sanctions
23
against them did not result.
"Pirate" broadcasting did not become an acute problem until the
late 1950's and 1960's, when nearly a dozen stations began transmitting in the Baltic, Irish and North Seas. 24 Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Holland, Belgium, France and especially England were
targets for the unauthorized broadcasts. Perhaps one explanation for
the prevalence of "pirate" stations off the coasts of these West European countries is that broadcasting in these countries is heavily
17. M. SIBTHORP, supra note 6, at 155.
18. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
19. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
2(1), 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
20. E.g., Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 6.
21. E.g., Naim Molvan v. Attorney-Gen. for Palestine, 15 Ann. Dig. 115 (P.C.
1948).
22. D. SirrH, supra note 2, at 72.
23. Id.

24. See Hunnings, supra note 4, at 410-12.
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regulated by public authorities. In all the affected countries, radio
communication is a State monopoly free of advertising.2 5 Television
broadcasting is also a State monopoly in these countries, although
26
some nations permit advertising and commercial television.
Most "pirate" broadcasts involved only radio communications;
however, one "pirate" television station also began transmitting.
Radio Noordzee and TV Noordzee, operating from an artificial structure erected on the seabed in the North Sea adjacent to the Dutch
coast but outside the Dutch territorial sea, began broadcasting to
Holland in the summer of 1964. Dutch nationals built the structure,
and the Reclame Exploitatie Maatschappij (R.E.M.), a private Dutch
Company, was responsible for the broadcasts.
While the Dutch were plagued by the R.E.M. dilemma, the British
were inundated by "pirate" broadcasts. In early 1961, one "pirate"
station, Radio Veronica, began broadcasting to Eastern England.27 In
1964, the problem became particularly serious when numerous unauthorized stations began broadcasting from ships and abandoned forts
off the British coast.2 8 Initially, the affected countries were slow to
take action against the "pirate" stations, but during the 1960's, there
was much discussion and subsequent legislation concerning "pirate"
broadcasting.
Early Attempts to Suppress "Pirate"Broadcasting
The first effort to address the problem of "pirate" broadcasting
was the 1938 Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (I.T.U.). 29 In 1949, by an agreement between the United
Nations and the I.T.U., the I.T.U. became a specialized agency of the
United Nations.3" In 1959, the Administrative Radio Conference
(Geneva) replaced the word "broadcasting" in the existing Radio
Regulations with the words "the operation of a broadcasting service."' 31 This action was apparently an attempt to distinguish "pirate"
25. Id. at 415-16.
26. Id. at 416.
27. Id. at 411-12.

28. M. SmTHORp, supra note 6, at 207; Hunnings, supra note 4, at 421.

29. The I.T.U. has nearly 125 members.
30. Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union, Apr. 26, 1949, 30 U.N.T.S. 315.
31. The latest revisions are found in I.T.U. Radio Regulations No. 28 (Geneva,
Dec. 21, 1959), 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893 [hereinafter cited as Radio
Regulations].

broadcasting from mere unauthorized radio communications and to
prohibit only the former. "Broadcasting service" refers to communications intended for mass audiences and therefore does not prohibit
other unauthorized communications. Furthermore, because the term
"mobile station" used in the earlier regulations was inapplicable if
the "pirate" station transmitted from a stationary ship or from an
artificial island 2 or installation, 33 the 1959 Conference adopted the
following provision: "The establishment and use of broadcasting
stations (sound broadcasting and television broadcasting stations) on
board ships, aircraft or any other floating
or airborne objects outside
'34
national territories is prohibited.
The difficulty concerning control of "pirate" broadcasting, however, has not been lack of prohibitions but rather lack of legitimate
sanctions. The I.T.U., as an international agency, cannot act directly
to regulate frequency assignments and other matters which are basically State concerns.3" For example, the Radio Regulations provide
for the inspection of radio stations on board ships by the proper authorities of the ships' ports.3 6 In addition, the governments to which
the ships are subject are to be notified if violations are found 37 so that
they may assess the situation and take the necessary action.3 8 However, none of these procedures can be implemented until the ships
enter the territorial waters of a country other than their own. Inspection and subsequent notification seldom occur because most unauthorized broadcasting ships do not come to shore.
The Radio Regulations which provide for States' sanctions are
ineffective for several reasons.3 9 The primary difficulty is that unauthorized broadcasting ships do not carry the flags of responsible
countries willing to punish their conduct, and no sanctions are provided if a State does not fulfill its obligations. Furthermore, not all
States have ratified the various international telecommunication
32. "Literally speaking, an artificial island is a man-made alluvion formed by
placing soil and/or rocks in the sea which partakes thus of the 'nature of territory.' It is a non-naturally formed structure, permanently attached to the sea-bed
and surrounded by water, vhich is above water at high tide." N. PAPADAKIS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF ARTIFICIAL IsLANDs 6 (1977).
33. "The term 'installations'. . . refers collectively to man-made structures
constructed from such other materials as concrete and steel, for example drilling platforms. These structures, therefore, do not partake of the 'nature of
territory' and do not possess the same degree of permanence as the artificial
islands." Id. For purposes of this Comment, however, the terms artificialislands and installationswill be used interchangeably.
34. Radio Regulations, supra note 31, No. 422 (parenthetical original).
35. D. SMTH, supra note 2, at 77.
36. Radio Regulations, supra note 31, No. 840.
37. Id., No. 842.
38. Id., No. 721.

39. D. SmrTH, supra note 2, at 75.
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conventions. 40 Those States which have not ratified the conventions

are not obliged to abide by them, and even those States which have
are not likely to suffer serious consequences if they breach their
obligations.
IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGISLATION

Nordic Legislation
In April, 1961, the Nordic Administrative Radio Conference met in
Oslo to discuis "pirate" broadcasting. The Conference members
agreed to allow the national radio authorities to handle the problem.
The national radio authorities stressed the immediate need for national legislation.41 During the summer of 1962, all four Nordic
countries enacted national legislation.42 The Nordic statutes distinguish between acts committed within the legislating States' territories and those committed extraterritorially. Also, the statutes of
each country equate the territories and citizenship of other Nordic
countries with the territory and citizenship of the legislating country
itself.
Shortly after the enactment of the Nordic legislation, several stations ceased transmission. However, not all broadcasters complied.
One station, the Lucky Star, only ceased transmissions temporarily.
The Danish police seized the ship. The ship's crew, the general organizer, and the representative of the company owning the ship, who
43
were all Danish citizens, were fined for violating Danish law. Simi-

larly, Swedish legislative efforts resulted in the prosecution of Radio
Syd's director (a Swedish citizen), 44 the radio announcers, and several people who supplied the ship.45 Because the prosecution and fines
did not deter the station from continuing its broadcasting, the Swedish Government imprisoned the director. 46 This action brought the
broadcasts to a halt.
Belgian Legislation
Although it deals in greater detail with the position of foreigners
than does the Nordic legislation, the Belgian legislation is directed
40. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 306.

41. Runnings, supra note 4, at 418.
42. See Act of Denmark, Jun. 22, 1962; Act of Finland, Jul. 27, 1962; Act of
Norway, Jun. 22, 1962; Act of Sweden, Jul. 27, 1962.
43. Hunnings, supra note 4, at 420 n.77.
44. Id. n.79.
45. Id. n.80.
46. Id. n.81.

specifically at mobile "pirate" stations. 47 The Belgian Act is more
restrictive because foreigners may be prosecuted only if they act in
Belgium or aboard a Belgian ship or aircraft, or if they act jointly
with Belgian nationals. In either situation, foreigners 48would be prosecuted only if apprehended within Belgian territory.
The Dutch Approach: The North Sea InstallationsAct
The Dutch took no legislative or administrative action in the 1960's
against "pirate" ships broadcasting outside Dutch territorial waters.
Instead, they devoted their efforts to the elimination of unauthorized
radio and television broadcasts transmitting from fixed installations. 49 Their efforts were in response to the activities of the R.E.M.
station previously mentioned. In formulating regulations to eliminate "pirate" broadcasting, the Dutch refused to equate the legal
position of artificial structures standing on the seabed with that of
ships. The Dutch Government based its refusal to equate artificial
structures with ships on the factual difference between the two.
Ships are movable so that their nationality cannot depend on their
location while installations are stationary.50 Also, seldom, if ever,
would any sort of registration exist. According to the Convention on
the High Seas, ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they
fly and are subject to that State's jurisdiction. 51 Applying this principle to installations, the State of registration would have jurisdiction.
The Dutch Government also refused to equate fixed installations
with islands. 52 Equating the two implied that sovereignty acquired
over the installations would extend to the subjacent waters and to
53
the airspace above the "island" or to a maritime belt around it.
Most countries have rejected this proposition because of two provisions in the Geneva Conventions of 1958. Article 10 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea states that "[a]n island is a naturallyformed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at
47. Belgian Act of May 14, 1930, art. 2, as amended on Dec. 18, 1962. See also

Hunnings, supra note 4, at 420; van Panhuys and van Emde Boas, supra note 2,
at 323.
48. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 324.
49. For a more detailed discussion of the Dutch situation, see Bos, La Libertd
de la Haute Mer: Quelques Probl~mes d'Actualit6, 12 NETH. INT'L L. REV.337
(1965); van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, note 2 supra;Woodliffe, Some Legal
Aspects of PirateBroadcastingin the North Sea, 12 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 365
(1965).
50. C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 109 (4th ed. 1959); M.
McDOUGAL & W. BURKE,THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 397 (1962).

51. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 5.
52. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 320.
53. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 18, arts. 1 & 2.
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high tide." 54 "Naturally-formed" disqualifies the fixed installations
from which "pirate" stations transmit because the installations are
artificially constructed. Neither size nor capacity for use has any
relevance to the conception of an island.5 5 Article 5 of the Convention
on the Continental Shelf can also be used to support the Dutch
Government's refusal because this article rejects the designation of
certain artificial installations as islands.5 6 However, the article deals
only with installations used in the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources.
The Dutch also considered granting sovereignty over the installations to the country whose nationals operated, erected, or owned the
structure. However, this alternative was not considered viable because it would cause uncertainties if operation and ownership of the
structures were inconsistent or changed constantly. Another problem
arises concerning who would make the various determinations. Furthermore, it would be possible to avoid restrictions by creating a
company under the laws of a State chosen for the sake of convenience. 57 In other words, a problem like that of "flags of convenience"
would arise if the builders, personnel, and owners were intentionally
58
selected to circumvent the laws of the target State.
A major factor adding to the Dutch Government's predicament
was the public opinion opposing the Dutch broadcasting associations' monopoly which enabled these unauthorized broadcasters to
gain wide popular support.5" Faced with this dilemma, the Dutch
Government enacted the North Sea Installations Act on December 3,
1964.60 As a result of the Act, Dutch police landed on the R.E.M.
installation ten days after passage of the Act, sealed its transmitters,
issued warrants against the broadcasters and impounded the broadcasting installments. 61 No country protested the Dutch Government's
actions. This result was especially significant because for the first
54. Id., art. 10(1).
55. M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUiLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 397 (1962).
56. "Such installations and devices ... do not possess the status of islands.
They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the
delimitation of the territorial sea of the coastal State." Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 19, art. 5(4).
57. D. SMITH, supra note 2, at 63.
58. Id..
59. See N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 32, at 72; van Panhuys & van Emde Boas,
supra note 2, at 308-09.
60. North Sea Installations Act, No. 447 of 3d Dec. 1964.

61. D. SMITH, supra note 2, at 83.

time a State took unilateral action against a "pirate" station. The
fact that no protests were made possibly signified general approval
of the Dutch action and was perhaps the first step in establishing
customary international law concerning "pirate" stations.
The North Sea Installations Act deals with fixed installations and
is not primarily concerned with the problem of "pirate" broadcasting. The primary purpose of the Act is to create some legal order for
installations standing in the seabed on that part of the continental
shelf under Dutch jurisdiction. 2 The Act applies to every installation
on the continental shelf off the Dutch coast. By enacting what many
referred to as the "anti-R.E.M. Act," the Dutch assumed that the
establishment and use of these seabed installations were neither
prohibited nor regulated by international law.63 The Government
claimed that the law was not designed
to assert sovereign rights of
64
jurisdiction over fixed installations.
Legal Theories Used to Justify Unilateral Action by the Dutch
The Dutch based their claim to jurisdiction on three considerations: (1) the legal vacuum theory; (2) the protection of legal interests; and (3) the notion of contiguity.65 Also, although the Dutch did
not explicitly rely on it, a theory known as the objective territorial
principle had already received wide acceptance and was significant
because of its similarity to the theories advanced by the Dutch. It no
doubt lent support to the Dutch position.
The Objective TerritorialPrinciple
The objective territorial principle permits States to claim territorial jurisdiction over acts committed in another State but which
produce an effect within the territory of the State claiming jurisdiction. 66 The United States was especially responsible for developing this principle in antitrust cases where activity occurring outside the United States, had a direct effect within its territory.6 7 In
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica68 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit stated: "[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends. ..
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

."

Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 327.
Id. at 330 n.113.
Id. at 331 n.123. See also D. SmTH, supra note 2, at 83.
Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 331-32.
D. SMITH, supra note 2, at 47-51; Hunnings, supra note 4, at 431-32.
D. SmTH, supra note 2, at 47.
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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The case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey),69 although later
repudiated by the Brussels Convention of 1952 and the 1958 Geneva
Convention, is another example of the objective territorial principle.
The Lotus, a French ship, collided with a Turkish ship on the high
seas, causing the sinking of the Turkish ship and the death of eight
people. When the Lotus docked in Turkish territory, Turkey instituted proceedings against the ship's French officer, claiming that
his negligence had produced effects on the Turkish ship and on
Turkish citizens and thus on Turkish territory. The Permanent Court
of International Justice resolved the dispute in favor of Turkey,
holding that the Turkish action was consistent with international
law. The Court stated that the act had produced an effect on Turkish
territory and that there was no rule of international law prohibiting a
State from asserting jurisdiction over a foreigner who commited acts
outside the State's territory. It has been stated that the Court's
reasoning concerning foreign vessels in the Lotus case is "equally
relevant to the case of artificial islands erected on the high seas by
' 70
foreigners.
In repudiating the Lotus case, the 1958 Geneva Convention stated:
In the event of a collision or of any other incident of navigation
concerning a ship on the high seas ... no penal or disciplinary pro-

ceeding may be instituted against such persons except before the
judicial or administrative authorities either
1 of the flag State or of the
State of which such person is a national2

Therefore, the objective territorial principle may be permissible in
situations which do not involve incidents of navigation.7 2 One test to
determine when to apply the principle is whether the act was meant
to produce an effect within another territory. 3 "Pirate" broadcasting
will generally qualify under this test because most unauthorized
transmissions are intentionally directed at a definite target State.
Another test applies the principle depending upon the seriousness of
the act. For example, France and Germany adhere to this modified
principle, maintaining that a State may prosecute for acts committed
abroad only when these acts are directed against the security or
financial credit of the State.7 4 This approach assumes that States
69. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.

70. D.H.N. Johnson in RechtsgeleerdeAdviezen 5 (privately printed advisory
opinion for the R.E.M., 1964).
71. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 11(1).
72. D. SwTH, supra note 2, at 49.
73. Id. at 47.
74. Hunnings, supra note 4, at 432.

"would not claim to define acts directed against their security in an
arbitrary way so as to include, for example,
criticism of their govern75
ments published in a foreign press."
The Legal Vacuum Theory
The legal vacuum theory states that if an occurrence is not covered
by existing international law, the affected State is free to formulate
rules to meet the problems created.7 6 The theory, first advanced by
Professor J.P.A. Francois7 suggests that international law does not
strive to provide areas of the world which are completely free of
national jurisdiction. Therefore, no wrongful acts or failures to act
should go unpunished because of lack of jurisdiction. In essence, the
theory contradicts the idea that the Convention on the High Seas is
law governing acts on the high seas. The theory recognizes the
concept of international law forbidding subjection of the high seas to
national
sovereignty but takes exception under special
circumstances.
One of these exceptions is international recognition of the nearest
coastal State's jurisdiction to explore and exploit the continental
shelf.7 8 Another exception is the subjection of ships and persons and
things on board to the authority of the State whose flag the ship is
flying. Furthermore, several conventions have given the Contracting
States special jurisdiction over each others' vessels on the high seas
for specific purposes.79 The conventions, however, were different
from the Dutch action because they were multilateral or bilateral
whereas the Dutch action was unilateral. This difference is significant because through a multilateral or bilateral agreement States
merely transfer their rights of jurisdiction. Contrary to this approach, the Dutch asserted rights of jurisdiction without the approval or agreement of other States.
Proponents of the legal vacuum theory maintain that the actions
occurring on installations built by private individuals should also be
subject to the jurisdiction of a particular State.8" They claim that the
complete absence of authority would encourage illegal acts. Illegal
outbreaks in fact took place on "pirate" stations off the English
coast. On June 20, 1965, for example, eleven people forcibly seized
Radio City, and on the following day the leader of the ousted group
(1963).
76. Note, JurisdictionalProblems Created by Artificial Islands, 10 SAN
75. J. BRIERLY, TiE LAW OF NATIONs 301

DIEGO L. REV. 638, 657 (1973).

77. See van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 315.
78. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 19, art. 5(2) & (4).
79. See Hunnings, supra note 4, at 426-27.
80. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 332.
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killed the head of the rival faction. 8' The legal vacuum supporters
relied upon these incidents to justify their theory, although such
incidents were not those which the Dutch actually sought to prevent
or punish.
Legal advisers of the R.E.M. station attacked the legal vacuiim
theory, contending that according to principles of international law
there is no legal vacuum. They noted that in the absence of territorial
jurisdiction upon the high seas, States may apply their law and
jurisdiction to their own nationals on installations owned by them on
the high seas.8 2 In 1955 the United States also expressed opposition
to the theory when its delegation at the United Nations stated: "[T]he
high seas are an area under a definite and established legal status
which requires freedom of navigation and use for all. They are not an
area in which a legal vacuum exists free to be filled by individual
83
states, strong or weak."
The Protection of Legal Interests Theory
Another doctrine advanced by the Netherlands Government was
the protection of legal interests theory. According to this theory,
under international law a State may exercise jurisdiction on the high
seas to protect its legal interests. 4 Proponents suggest that just as the
basis for the Convention on the Continental Shelf was a desire to
protect domestic economic interests, control of fixed installations on
the high seas is necessary to protect national interests.8 5 The legal
interests need not be those of the State itself but might be those of the
State's citizens or of the international community. Therefore, the
Dutch justified the North Sea Installations Act as an attempt to
subject fixed installations on the high seas near the Dutch coast to
domestic legal provisions to protect Dutch legal interests. 86 An argument could be made to support the Government's position because
the R.E.M. represented an economic threat to the State broadcasting
monopoly as well as a potential threat to the security of the country.
81. B. PAULU, supra note 4, at 23.
82. C.J. Colombos in Rechtsgeleerde Adviezen 4 (privately printed advisory
opinion for the R.E.M., 1964); D.H.N. Johnson in Rechtsgeleerde Adviezen 8
(privately printed advisory opinion for the R.E.M., 1964); Sir Humphrey Waldock in Rechtsgeleerde Adviezen 31 (privately printed advisory opinion for the
R.E.M., 1964). See N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 32, at 129-30.
83. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-55 (1965).
84. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 333-34.
85. D. SMITH, supra note 2, at 62.
86. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 333.

Thus, the Dutch might attempt to justify their action as a preventive
measure. Furthermore, problems such as frequency interference and
tax evasion also implicate Dutch legal interests.
The Notion of Contiguity
The notion of contiguity is a subsidiary theory which was used by
the Dutch in conjunction with the legal vacuum and legal interest
theories.8 7 The notion of contiguity holds that once it is determined
that some State may exercise jurisdiction to fill an existing legal
vacuum and to protect certain legal interests, the nearest coastal
State should have that jurisdiction. The Dutch Government claimed
that this notion gave them the right to take measures to protect
Holland's legal order up to an unspecified distance contiguous to its
coast.8 8 This theory followed recently promulgated principles in the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 89 the
Convention on the Continental Shelf,9" the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 91 and the
Convention on the High Seas. 92 These conventions recognized the
extraterritorial rights of the coastal State.
The notion of contiguity, however, has certain weaknesses. One
weakness is that it conflicts with various provisions of the Geneva
Conventions. Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf
grants the coastal State sovereign rights over the continental shelf
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources. 3 No mention is made of fixed installations or unauthorized
broadcasting. Article 3 specifically states that the coastal State's
limited rights over the continental shelf "do not affect the legal
status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace
above those waters."9 4 By excluding claims to sovereignty over the
airspace above the waters, the Convention prohibits its application
to broadcasting because airspace is the medium which broadcasting
uses.

95

Also, the Convention on the High Seas allows coastal States the
right of hot pursuit of foreign ships on the high seas when good
87. Id. at 334.
88. N. PAPADAKIs, supra note 32, at 130.
89. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra

note 18, art. 24(1).
90. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 19, art. 2.
91. See Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, arts. 6, 7, & 14, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
92. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, arts. 12 & 13.
93. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 19, art. 2(1).
94. Id., art. 3.
95. D. SmrTH, supra note 2, at 62.

[VOL. 15: 547, 1978]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

reason exists to believe that the ship has violated the laws of that
State.95 Attempts to draw support from this provision for the actions
taken against "pirate" stations are fallacious for several reasons. The
Convention requires that pursuit be undertaken while the ship is
within the internal waters or territorial sea of the coastal State. 7 The
Convention also assumes that the violation occurred while the
foreign ship was within the coastal State's territory. Coastal States
affected by "pirate" broadcasting could not meet these requirements.
Finally, various conventions98 provide for coastal State control over
certain activities only, and would, therefore, require an inclusion of
unauthorized broadcasting from artificial installations among the
regulated activities.
The R.E.M. advisers criticized the notion of contiguity. They based
their attack on the Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands),9 9 in which the court said the notion "of contiguity, understood
as a basis of territorial sovereignty, has no foundation in international law." The court stated that the concept of contiguity is wholly
lacking in precision and would lead to arbitrary results. Eminent
publicists in international law have also expressed opposition to the
notion of contiguity:
The mere contiguity of an artificial island to a given coast, permanently above water or an elevation of the sea-bed, does not confer, under

the rules of positive international law, any title of sovereignty to the

coastal State if it is situated or erected outside its territorial waters.

The same rule applies to the property existing on the island if it is

owned by foreign nationals or companies."'

The Dutch Government maintained, however, that until an international agreement could be reached, the nearest coastal State could
exercise jurisdiction over fixed structures on that State's continental
shelf to prevent legal vacuums. The Dutch were by no means claim96. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 1, art. 23(1).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, art. 1(1), done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra
note 19, art. 2(1).
99. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 869, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 910 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
100. C. J. Colombos in RechtsgeleerdeAdviezen4 (privately printed advisory
opinion for the R.E.M., 1964); D.H.N. Johnson in Rechtsgeleerde Adviezen 9
(privately printed advisory opinion for the R.E.M., 1964); Sir Humphrey Waldock in RechtsgeleerdeAdviezen 38 (privately printed advisory opinion for the
R.E.M., 1964).

ing territorial sovereignty over the structures. Instead, the Dutch
were claiming only the right to take certain unilateral action to
protect the legal interests of the Netherlands as the closest coastal
State.1°1 The Dutch Government considered the notion of contiguity
as secondary to the legal vacuum theory and the protection of legal
interests theory.
Agreement of the Council of Europe
Like the Dutch, the British acted cautiously concerning "pirate"
radio ships. 10 2 Both the British and the Dutch Governments based
their inaction against "pirate" radio ships on the fact that as early as
November, 1961, the executive office of the Legal Committee on
Broadcasting and Television of the Council of Europe had considered
the problem. Both Britain and Holland desired to delay national
legislation until an agreement was reached by the Council. 0 3 Realizing the necessity of effective regional legislation, the Council of
Europe sought agreement on certain essential clauses from which
individual countries could draft their own legislation. 10 4 Finally, on
January 20, 1965, the Council of Europe opened for signature the
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted
from Stations Outside National Territories. 0 5
The Agreement is in many respects similar to the Nordic Acts.
However, the Agreement approaches the question of aliens more
cautiously, reserving to the Contracting States the right to enact
their own legislation on that matter.10 The document applies specifically to broadcasting stations operating from "ships, aircraft, or any
other floating or airborne objects"' 0 7 outside national territories,
although it states that nothing in the Agreement prevents a Contracting Party from applying the provisions to broadcasting stations on
fixed installations.0 8 Coverage extends to nationals within the territory of the State concerned, on its ships or aircraft, or outside national territories on any ships, aircraft, or other floating or airborne
objects. The Agreement includes non-nationals only when the act is
committed in the State's territory, on its ships or aircraft, or on any
floating or airborne object under its jurisdiction. 0 9 The Agreement
101. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 335.
102. Hunnings, supra note 4, at 422.
103. M. SIBTHox', supra note 6, at 207; Hunnings, supra note 4, at 207.
104. D. SMITH, supra note 2, at 87 n.78.
105. Council of Europe Treaty, Eur. T.S. No. 53, reprintedin 14 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 434 (1965).
106. Id., art. 4(a), reprintedin 14 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).
107. Id., art. 1, reprintedin 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).
108. Id., art. 4(b), reprinted in 14 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 434, 435 (1965).
109. Id., art. 3, reprintedin 14 INT'L & CoM. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).
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does not in itself permit State action against aliens outside its jurisdiction or against the station if it is outside the State's jurisdiction.

The Agreement states, however, that nothing in it prevents a
Contracting State from applying the provisions concerned to persons
other than those specified." 0 Thus, the Agreement does not condemn
the Dutch action.
The traditional principle of personal jurisdiction has been adopted
with respect to nationals, while the principle of territorial or quasiterritorial jurisdiction has been adopted with respect to non-nationals.'1 ' According to Article 2, "[e]ach Contracting Party undertakes
to take appropriate steps to make punishable as offences, in accordance with its domestic law, the establishment or operation of broadcasting stations referred to in Article 1, as well as acts of collaboration knowingly performed.""' 2 The following are included as acts of
collaboration: provision, maintenance or repair of equipment; provision of supplies; provision of transportation for or the transportation
of persons, equipment or supplies; the order or production of any
material, including advertisements, to be broadcast; and the provi3
sion of services concerning advertisements."
The collaboration provision is especially significant because it represents the first attempt to regulate those who buy commercial time
from "pirate" radio stations, although a few advertisers had previously been prosecuted for somewhat different reasons." 4 By prohibiting purchase of advertising time by nationals, the Agreement
affects the major source of revenue." 5 The stations are thereby forced
to recruit foreign sponsors who have products with wide distribution. This task is difficult because national advertising agencies may
6
not be used to locate sponsors."
The Agreement was signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the
110. Id., art. 4(a), reprinted in 14

INT'L

& COMP. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).

111. N. PAPADAKIS, supra note 32, at 136.

112. Council of Europe Treaty, art. 2(1), Eur. T.S. No. 53, reprintedin 14 INT'L

& CoTS?. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).

113. Id., art. 2(2)(a) to (e), reprintedin 14 INT'L & Com. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).
114. State v. Dessing (Frederiksberg Birkeret 1961) unrep., as cited in Hunnings, supra note 4, at 424 n.109 (Danish dentist who advertised on a "pirate"
station was held to have acted unprofessionally, notwithstanding his contention
that the advertisement was issued outside the State's jurisdiction).
115. D. SMITH, supra note 2, at 79.
116. Council of Europe Treaty, art. 2(2)(c), reprintedin 14 INT'L & ComP. L.Q.
434, 434 (1965).

United Kingdom. The Dutch were the last to sign, perhaps because of
their reluctance to accept so strict a provision as Article 3.117 This
provision would seem to compel Dutch authorities to take action
against foreign stations which do not harm Dutch interests as well as
against Dutch ships broadcasting religious services. 118 Also, because
the Agreement makes no distinction regarding program content, a
State would have to take similar action against all unauthorized
broadcasting regardless of whether the program content was religious, politically subversive, or similar to that of domestic stations.
Although the Agreement did not establish an innovative jurisdictional policy, it was extremely successful in eliminating most of
the "pirate" broadcasting stations on the North Sea. 119 Its success
has been attributed primarily to the provisions eliminating the stations' closest and most convenient sources of supplies and equipment
2
and, most important, their sources of revenue.1 1
The Marine &c., Broadcasting(Offences) Act
In accordance with the provisions of the Council of Europe Agreement was the Marine &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, which the
United Kingdom passed in 1967.121 The Act's scope is somewhat
broader than the Agreement, extending coverage to broadcasts from
marine structures and other objects in the water. However, the Act
basically complies with the requirements in the Agreement. The
prohibition extends to ships or aircraft registered in the United
Kingdom and broadcasting from any location. The legislation also
applies to ships or aircraft not registered in the United Kingdom if
"in or over the United Kingdom or external waters."' 22 Thus, the Act
applies to non-nationals if they act in the United Kingdom or its
external waters or on a ship or aircraft registered in the United
Kingdom. According to Article 9(1), "external waters" means those
which are within the seaward limits of the territorial sea. 2 1 The Act
prohibits operation of "pirate" stations and activities that support or
further the operation of these stations. 24 The activities enumerated
are essentially the same as those specified in the Agreement.
There is a significant distinction between the Act and the Agreement in the definition of the term broadcasting.The Act defines
broadcasting as a wireless telegraphic transmission of sounds or
117. Id., art. 3, reprintedin 14 INT'L & COmp. L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).

118.
119.
120.
121.

Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 2, at 325.
M. SIBTHORP, supra note 6, at 156.
Id. at 207-08.
Marine &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, c. 41.
122. Id., art. 1(1).
123. Id., art. 9(1).

124. Id., art. 4(3)(a) to (f).
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visual images intended for general reception, regardless of whether
the transmission is actually received. 12 The Agreement requires only
that the broadcast be "capable of being received."' 126 Under the British Act it is unnecessary to prove capability of reception. The intent
of the person transmitting the broadcast will suffice even if the
broadcast does not reach the United Kingdom. Like the Agreement,
the Act's effectiveness lies in the fact that27it eliminates the stations'
primary sources of supplies and revenue.

Shortly after the Marine &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act became
effective, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) adopted a resolution against offshore broadcasting stations.

28

The resolution is in the form of a declaration urging States

to take necessary steps by national legislation to prevent the supply
of food, fuel and advertising materials, and services necessary to
operate "pirate" stations. The resolution also requests that Member
States deny registration to ships used for unauthorized broadcasting.
The I.T.U. adopted a view similar to that of IMCO. This view requests that States take legislative action to eliminate the sources of
supplies, revenue and food. 1 9 Neither the IMCO nor the I.T.U. resolutions mentioned extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-nationals
and their property.
An Overview
The problems arising from "pirate" broadcasting are analogous to
the predicament States faced in the first half of this century concerning air law. Initially, countries enacted national legislation and regulations governing the airspace and the right of passage. However,
because States often had conflicting regulations and no international
agreement existed, many disputes arose. National legislation was
unsuccessful because of the international nature of air law. As a
result, the Paris Convention of 1919, the Habana Convention of 1928,
and the Chicago Convention of 1944 were organized. 3 0 These
125.
126.
Comp.
127.
128.

Id., art. 9(1)(7).
Council of Europe Treaty, art. 1, Eur. T.S. No. 53, reprintedin 14 INT'L &
L.Q. 434, 434 (1965).
M. SmTHORP, supra note 6, at 208.
IMCO Doc. MSC XII/23, Annex I, at 2 (Nov. 30, 1965).

129. Memorandum by the International Frequency Registration Board of the
I.T.U. on Broadcasting Stations Operated on Board Ships, Aircraft or Other
Floating or Airborne Objects Outside National Territories, in IMCO Doc. MSC
XII/23/Add. 2, at 10 (Dec. 21, 1965).
130. 9 M. WHrEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 345 (1968).

conventions established international agreement on the subject of
public international air law.'' Because of the international nature of
"pirate" broadcasting, international recognition of and agreement
concerning this problem is also needed.
The various multilateral and unilateral actions taken by the European community were partially successful in eliminating "pirate"
broadcasting. However, these legislative efforts had an inherent
weakness-they were not measures recognized by the international
community. Although no State expressly objected to the actions,
there was no international agreement concerning unauthorized
broadcasting, nor was there general acceptance of the measures
taken.
The legislation enacted to suppress "pirate" broadcasting was not
effective necessarily because of its strength. Instead, the various
measures were effective because other States failed to express opposition. Had other States reacted adversely, it is probable that the
States enacting the measures would have submitted. Thus, because
legislation against "pirate" stations might be opposed in the future,
an international agreement is needed. International agreements are
effective because they provide the authority under which States may
act. Of course, States may disregard this authority and fail to take
action. However, if a State desires to act, that State may do so
knowing that it has the approval of the international community.
International agreements are valuable for this reason if for no other.
UNITED NATIoNs ACTION

The most recent and certainly the most significant legislation
concerning "pirate" broadcasting came out of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (ICNT), concluded in July, 1977, deals solely with
law of the sea concerns.3 The ICNT is the first document of its kind
to be formulated by a large international organization, and it is the
most composite legislation regarding "pirate" broadcasting. Article
109 states:
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of unauthorized
broadcasting from the high seas.
2. Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting from the high
seas may be prosecuted before the court of the flag State of the vessel,
the place of registry of the installation, the State of which the person is
a national, any place where the transmissions can be received or any
State where authorized radio communications is suffering interference.
131. Id.
132. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10
(1977).
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3. On the high seas, a State having jurisdiction in accordance with
paragraph 2 may, in conformity with article 110, arrest any person or
ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting
apparatus.

4. For the purposes of the present Convention, "unauthorized broadcasting" means the transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international
regulations, but
133
excluding the transmission of distress calls.

In the second and third paragraphs, the international community
has for the first time taken exception to the traditional principle of
territorial or quasi-territorial jurisdiction over non-nationals. The
ICNT authorizes States to arrest and prosecute offenders on the high
seas regardless of the offenders' nationality. The North Sea Installations Act is the only legislation which recognizes extraterritorial
jurisdiction over aliens, but it does so on a different precept, namely,
jurisdiction over fixed installations on Holland's continental shelf.
Of course, the North Seas Installations Act was a national act, not an
international act.
Unlike previous action, the ICNT ignores acts of collaboration,
such as supplying the "pirate" station with food, fuel or equipment
or buying commercial time from the station. However, omission of
such a provision is explainable by virture of the comprehensiveness
of the jurisdictional provision. By providing for extraterritorial
jurisdiction, even over non-nationals, the ICNT obviates the need for
indirect measures to restrain unauthorized broadcasting. Assuming
that the ICNT receives wide acceptance, a State may take direct
action against a broadcasting station without resorting to actions
against the sources of supplies and revenue.
The significance of Article 109's definition of unauthorized broadcasting stated in paragraph four above is twofold. First, it includes
transmissions from mobile stations as well as from fixed structures,
but not transmissions from airborne objects. The drafters of the
article may have anticipated this form of transmission but excluded
it because the ICNT deals specifically with law of the sea, and,
therefore, unauthorized broadcasting from airborne objects is not
within its scope. Second, the definition is similar to that of the
Marine &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act in that the transmission
need only be "intended for reception by the general public," even if it
never reaches the intended audience. Thus, a "pirate" broadcaster
133. Id., art. 109.

may be arrested and prosecuted without the prerequisite that the
transmission be received or the State be harmed, so long as intent to
have the broadcast received exists.
Article 109 also clarifies the ambiguity regarding Article 2 of the
Convention on the High Seas mentioned during the discussion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction problems.'34 The ICNT impliedly rejects
a broad interpretation of Article 2. By providing sanctions against
"pirate" broadcasting regardless of adverse affects on another
State's use of the high seas, the ICNT eliminates the need to show
adverse effect. In fact, the claim that "pirate" broadcasting actually
affects another State's use of the high seas is inaccurate. Reading the
ICNT in conjunction with Article 2, a proper interpretation indicates
that the international community has recognized the four
enumerated freedoms as well as any others recognized by the general
principles of international law. Article 109 implicitly rejects "pirate"
broadcasting as a recognized freedom. Thus, the ICNT adheres to the
narrow interpretation of Article 2.
Several possible factors may have contributed to the enactment of
Article 109. The European Agreement and the British Act almost
totally eliminated "pirate" broadcasting. Therefore, there appeared
to be no immediate threat to States. Yet, what accounts for the
United Nations' recent concern nearly fifteen years after the peak of
the problem? One explanation may be that the provisions were politically inspired. Having already expressed opposition to Western
broadcasters transmitting into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
it is apparent that the leaders of the Communist Bloc States favor
stricter controls on telecommunications. Perhaps the Communist
leaders view "pirate" broadcasting as another threat to governmentcontrolled media. Likewise, other States realize the possibility of
unauthorized stations transmitting politically inflamatory or subversive broadcasts. This possibility has been realized in Thailand. The
Thai Government is currently plagued by radio broadcasts from
southern China. 135 The broadcasts include popular music interspersed with Communist propaganda. This situation is somewhat different from "pirate" broadcasting because the broadcasts directed toward Thailand are transmitted from another country. Nevertheless,
it exemplifies the threat posed by unauthorized broadcasting and the
importance in preventing this sort of activity. "Pirate" broadcasting
is yet another means of access to foreign audiences for the purpose of
communicating a particular political ideology. Perhaps the only
countries opposed to stricter controls are those such as Panama and
134. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
135. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1977, § l-A, at 1, col. 4.
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Liberia, which have been quite irresponsible in the past regarding
ship registrations and gain much income from registrations.
Also, although "pirate" stations have in the past been prevalent
only in northern Europe, nothing precludes the proliferation of this
means of communication in other areas of the world. The likelihood
of stations establishing themselves off the coasts of other States is
great where a high possibility of commercial reward is present.'3 6
Certainly, reward might be at least temporarily feasible in States
where the domestic legal controls are ambiguous or nonexistent. If
the profit margin is great enough to justify the initial investment,
stations might begin broadcasting even where the probability of
government action against the stations is great.137 In fact, in the late
1960's there were rumors of a "pirate" station beginning operations
off the Southern California coast. The station, "Radio Free America,"
intended to cover an area from Santa Barbara to San Diego and
broadcast an uncensored commercial program.138 Had transmission
actually begun, the station might have made a sizable profit before
the Government could enact legislation against "pirate" broadcasting. Thus, it is possible that Article 109 of the ICNT is both an
economically and politically inspired attempt to avoid the future
proliferation of "pirate" broadcasting.
The effectiveness of Article 109 cannot presently be determined.
Although the provision may be comprehensive, it will be ineffective
if States fail to enforce it in the future. The true test of approval will
not come until the document is actually used. The Charter of the
United Nations provides sanctions against States that fail to abide by
the established rules of international law, 3 9 but these sanctions are
rather limited and are not a sufficient deterrent. In fact, the United
Nations for the first time implemented the provided sanctions
against a Member State on November 4, 1977, by directing all States
136. D. SITH, supra note 2, at 38.
137. Id.
138. 73 BROADCASTING No. 2, at 10 (July 10, 1967).
139. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the authority to
determine what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions. The Security Council may call upon the

members of the U.N. to apply such measures. These actions include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council consider
these measures to be inadequate, it may take other limited action necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. These other actions include demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces. U.N. CHARTER art. 41, paras. 1 & 2.

to "cease forthwith"
from providing arms and related material to
140
South Africa.
The imposition of sanctions against South Africa is significant for
a number of reasons. First, the fact that the arms embargo represents
the first time the United Nations has imposed sanctions against a
Member State illustrates both the discord within the Security
Council and the general reluctance of the United Nations to use the
provided sanctions. Second, because the Charter prohibits interference in the internal affairs of Member States, the United Nations had
to use "the acquisition of arms and related material" as the reason
for the embargo. 141 By prohibiting interference in a Member State's'
internal affairs, the Charter severely limits the United Nation's effectiveness in applying sanctions. Finally, enforcement of sanctions may
be as difficult as their enactment. For example, Secretary General
Kurt Waldheim is to report on the effectiveness of the embargo
against South Africa. If widespread violations occur, a watchdog
committee might be established. 142 Formation of a watchdog
committee will certainly be a difficult task, and its success in
eliminating violations is doubtful. Thus, the effectiveness of the
United Nations' power to impose sanctions is not altogether certain.
CONCLUSION

The major problem confronting States dealing with "pirate"
broadcasting has been the limitation upon these States' jurisdiction.
National laws cannot exceed the jurisdictional limits of the States
which enact them. Therefore, unless States rely solely on indirect
measures, they must either extend their jurisdictional limits in certain situations or depend on international agreements to control
occurrences outside their territories.
Because the international community has not always been able to
keep pace with rapidly developing technology, often States have
been compelled to take unilateral action until an international agreement could be effected.
The States affected by "pirate" broadcasting found it necessary to
implement national and regional legislation in the absence of international agreement. However, at last the international community
established a provision which prohibits "pirate" broadcasting and
provides sanctions against it. It will no longer be necessary for States
confronted with "pirate" broadcasting to either enact national legis140. L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1977, § 1, at 6, col. 4.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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lation or develop alternate control measures without the approval of
the international community.
Also, in light of the other provisions within the ICNT, it is questionable whether Article 109 is actually necessary. The ICNT proposes a territorial sea of up to twelve nautical miles 14 3 and also
provides for an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 miles (as measured from the baselines used to determine the breadth of the territorial sea). 44 If these proposals receive wide acceptance, States will
have sovereignty over as much as 200 miles of sea adjacent to their
coasts. Therefore, they may suppress "pirate" transmissions which
are broadcast within the 200 mile zone, and the likelihood of broadcasts from beyond the 200 mile zone is small.
Nevertheless, the problem of "pirate" broadcasting is not
completely solved. Because Article 109 of the ICNT is so late in
arriving, the provision is almost outdated. Although the ICNT prohibits broadcasts from ships and installations on the high seas, the
possibility of transmitting from airborne objects is still available.
Although sound and visual communication from airborne objects
such as planes and satellites is a very expensive form of transmission,
the technical capability exists. "Pirate" broadcasting might assume
this forjn of transmitting in the future, thereby creating more problems concerning unauthorized broadcasting. What then, another fifteen years without international action?
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J. HANNA

143. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, art. 3
(1977).
144. Id., art. 57.

